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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 001472

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STATE FOR AF/SPG, EUR/RPM, AND IO/PSC

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [MOPS](#) [KPKO](#) [SU](#) [AU](#)

SUBJECT: AU PLANNERS AND NATO DISCUSS DARFUR PEACE  
AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTATION

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, A.I. JANET WILGUS. REASON: 1.4 (D).

¶1. (C) SUMMARY. A meeting between visiting DOD DASD Whelan, African Union officials working on Darfur issues, the NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Planning, and Embassy officials, highlighted challenges in implementing the May 5 Darfur Peace Agreement. The AU DITF POLAD called for continued pressure on non-signatories, but recommended against the imposition of sanctions; he also noted that Presidents Obasanjo and Mbeki may be among heads of state visiting Sudan to urge GOS compliance. According to the AU's chief logistician for Darfur, the CONOPS for AMIS enhancement is still being developed and will be presented to the AU Peace and Security Council in mid-June for approval. AU officials underscored the need for both logistic and financial assistance from donor countries and partners; NATO assistance to the AU had given NATO greater credibility in Africa, especially given the historical burden of having supported those opposing African independence movements in the 1960s. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (U) On May 20, visiting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs Theresa Whelan discussed the May 15 African Union Peace and Security Council's (PSC) decision on Darfur with NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General (DASG) for Planning Amb. Maurits Jochems (Netherlands), NATO POLAD Hasan Aygun (Turkey) and AU Darfur Integrated Task Force (AU DITF) officials: Political Advisor Dr. Solomon Gomez, Chief of Administration Control and Management Center Commodore Binega Mesfin, and Head of Civilian Police (CIVPOL) Karl Mario Nobin. Charge, DCM, DATT, and emboffs also participated.

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PARTNERS SHOULD PRESSURE BUT NOT SANCTION NON-SIGNATORIES  
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¶3. (C) Rebel movements "not resident in Darfur" had recently traveled to Western capitals, Dr. Gomez said, underscoring the necessity of AU partner countries' (i.e., non-member states) continuing pressure on both the SLM/A group of Abdul Wahid al-Nur and the JEM of Khalil Ibrahim to sign the May 5 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) prior to the May 31 deadline established by the May 15 AU PSC communique (forwarded to AF/SPG). Such pressure was as important as continued financial assistance from donors, he said. Both the JEM and SLM/A needed to know the DPA would not be renegotiated. According to Gomez, the DPA thoroughly addressed land issues,

concerns about the 1956 border, and the possible consolidation of 3 Darfur states into one; rather than establish further preconditions for signing, parties could consider continuing discussions as signatories. As AU Darfur mediator Amb. Sam Ibok had observed (septel), the DPA was weighted in favor of the people of Darfur, not its leaders; Wahid's refusal to sign was due to his personal ambition to become vice president, Gomez said.

14. (C) As the OAU's sanctions unit chief during South Africa's apartheid era, Gomez asserted that sanctions would not work, and should only be used as a last resort. "What assets does Wahid have?" he asked rhetorically. A sanctions regime without any enforcement mechanism, such as the arms embargo imposed on the Democratic Republic of Congo, would not be effective, he said.

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AFRICAN HEADS OF STATE TO PUSH SUDAN TO IMPLEMENT DPA  
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15. (C) Mechanisms to ensure compliance with the DPA presented a challenge, Gomez said. Attacks by Wahid and Minni Minnawi's rival SLM/A factions on each other appeared to have ceased, but could easily resume. As Sudan could not be relied upon to implement the DPA by itself, it was necessary for the Committee of Heads of State and Government, referred to in both the March 10 and May 15 PSC decisions, to travel to Sudan to push for implementation. (NOTE: In a May 22 meeting with U.S., UK, Canadian, EU, NATO, and UN representatives, Gomez explained that the Committee of Heads of State would represent five regions, and would likely include Nigerian President Obasanjo and South African President Mbeki but not Senegalese President Wade. "It is

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certain they will go" to Sudan, he said. END NOTE.)

16. (C) Mesfin observed that by urging both rebels and the Janjaweit to disarm, the Joint Commission and Enhanced Ceasefire Commission were the key bodies for DPA implementation. However, he acknowledged that lack of any punitive measures for ceasefire violations was "a reflection of the weakness we have." AU Commission Chairperson Konare could only convoke Sudan's ambassador, and then refer violations to the PSC.

17. (SBU) Mesfin observed the difficulty of disarming predominantly pastoralist IDPs, which would require placing them in camps, and underscored that disarmament was not within the AU's mandate. "We are not there to disarm anyone," he said. The DPA called for the GOS to disarm the Janjaweit, while rebels were to be reintegrated. Gomez added that the GOS also needed to disarm additional groups it had armed: "The GOS knows those it has disarmed, and it must disarm them."

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CONOPS FOR ENHANCED AMIS STILL IN PROGRESS  
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18. (SBU) Discussing next steps following the May 15 PSC decision, Gomez and Mesfin said the AU was still developing a new concept of operations (CONOPS) for an enhanced African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which would be considered by another PSC meeting in mid-June; a pledging conference for AMIS would follow one week later. Gomez asserted that transition from an AU-led to a UN-led peacekeeping operation was still possible by October; Mesfin disagreed, observing that the September 30 deadline for UN transition was "too tight." The last AMIS battalion would arrive in Darfur only one month prior to AMIS's termination, Mesfin said. "So where's our strength?" he asked. AMIS enhancement would require five additional battalions from as yet unidentified troop contributing countries, Mesfin said. However, prior to transition, the "UN should take some of the burden," he said,

assuming greater responsibility for providing resources, manpower, and management for AMIS.

¶9. (SBU) A revised CONOPS should restructure AMIS to make its protection force more proactive, so that it protects civilians and implements the DPA, rather than just protect military observers (MILOBs), Mesfin said. Additional changes included reducing AMIS's eight sectors to three, establishing 15 additional camps (not only to accommodate the five additional battalions, but also to disperse the AMIS force), and establishing a reserve battalion.

¶10. (SBU) Nobin underscored the need to harmonize CIVPOL operations with that of the AMIS military forces. An amended CONOPS would realign CIVPOL sectors with those of the military, placing CIVPOL officers with each of the military's 13 battalions. The success of CIVPOL operations would depend on the military's ability to establish concentric buffer zones (manned by AMIS military forces) and demilitarized zones (patrolled by liaison officers) around IDP camps, he said. Moreover, GOS police, who had executive powers, were needed within the camps themselves, he added, to disarm IDPs. Some 65 IDP camps were registered, but nearly double that number (108) were unregistered, Nobin said. Registered camps would likely grow in size, he said, as their enhanced security would draw IDPs from less secure unregistered camps.

¶11. (C) Agreeing with DASD Whelan's observation that verification was key, Mesfin added that AMIS capabilities and air or ground transport assets needed to be enhanced to provide AMIS with greater mobility. Attack helicopters, possibly from Egypt, South Africa, or Nigeria, would be most useful, Mesfin said. Asked whether the GOS would accept such helicopters, Gomez noted that the GOS agreed to armored personnel carriers (APCs) only after AMIS argued they were needed to protect against attacks by rebels, rather than by the GOS.

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DONOR COMMITMENT NEEDED TO ENSURE SUCCESS OF AMIS  
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¶12. (SBU) As successful implementation of the DPA required a secure environment, donor commitment to fund AMIS enhancement was critical, Mesfin said. Ongoing challenges included having only one week of food in stock, as well as the AU's non-payment of AMIS troops and military observers for two months. Three months after the previous pledging conference for AMIS, only 20 per cent of the funds needed had been pledged; six months later, only 50 per cent had been pledged. Arguing that AMIS "must have assurances," Mesfin recommended the establishment of a donors' trust fund, hailed the provision of assistance in kind (urging the United States to continue supporting contracts with PAE), and said that EU funds to pay AMIS troops could not be conditional on the receipt of financial reports from the AU. Noting pressure to place AMIS troops along the Chad-Sudan border, Gomez recommended pushing Libya to fund their deployment.

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NATO'S ROLE: ENHANCING AU CAPABILITIES  
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¶13. (SBU) Citing NATO's backing of Portugal against African independence movements in the 1960s, Gomez said NATO had since "proven its neutrality" through its assistance to the AU on both AMIS and the African Standby Force. NATO could further assist with developing the capabilities of regional organizations, such as EASBRIG or ECOWAS, he said. Commodore Mesfin was more reticent: NATO should define its own role in Africa and then approach the AU. "It is difficult for the AU to ally itself with a regional military organization," Mesfin said. Gomez countered that AU PSC members were aware of

NATO's role in supporting AMIS; the enhancement of AU capabilities was the central goal, with no restriction on the origin of such assistance, he said.

¶14. (U) DASD Whelan noted that the NATO-AU relationship could focus on longer-term goals, such as developing the African Standby Force, or on meeting the AU's immediate needs, such as logistics for peace support operations.

¶15. (U) NATO DASG Jochems observed that in discussions on establishing NATO's charter, the United States had pushed for NATO to avoid Africa and other post-colonial areas. NATO could provide a useful mechanism for coordination with its 26 member states, some of which were already very active in supporting the AU in Sudan (such as Canada and the United States), Jochems said. Noting that NATO's first major peace support operations were conducted on behalf of Muslims, Jochems said there was a contradiction between explaining NATO's role while keeping a low profile.

¶16. (C) COMMENT: Coming just days after the May 15 AU PSC decision that, inter alia, urged "the Chairperson of the Commission to consult urgently with potential troop contributing countries, as well as with AU Partners to secure the required support," this meeting with several key AU planners highlighted NATO and USG interest in engaging closely with the AU on enhancing operations in Sudan and preparing for a transition to a UN peacekeeping operation. The varying comments by some of the AU's chief planners of operations in Sudan underscore that assistance from NATO and other partners is welcome, but continues to be politically sensitive. END COMMENT.

¶17. (U) DASD Whelan did not have the opportunity to clear this cable prior to departing Addis Ababa.  
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